ASML / Nikon
Nikon Had the Light. ASML Knew What to Do With It.
In the year Nikon’s lithography business lost ¥58.6 billion, its camera business made money. Why two companies facing the same signals moved in opposite directions, and why the answer was set long before the fork.
In the fiscal year ended March 2010, Nikon’s lithography business, the unit that uses light to print circuits for chips and displays, posted an operating loss of ¥58.6 billion. That same year, Nikon’s camera business earned ¥52.1 billion. Three months later, the executive who had been running cameras became Nikon’s president. The next-generation lithography system Nikon had promised by 2012 never shipped.
ASML went through the same downturn. Its sales fell 46%, and it lost money. Even so, at the end of 2010 it began shipping pre-production units of its next-generation system to customer fabs. Two years later, it brought Intel, TSMC and Samsung in as shareholders to help pay for development. From the 1980s through 2002, Nikon was the world’s leading producer of lithography equipment. By 2018, ASML held more than 80% of the market by revenue. Nikon held about 10%. [1]
Why did two companies facing the same signals move in opposite directions? Banseog’s answer: the choice wasn’t made at the fork. Each company had a way of choosing that it had repeated long before the fork arrived. At the fork, that way simply played out.
Two playbooks, written long before the fork
Nikon began in 1917, when three optical manufacturers merged to form “a comprehensive, fully integrated optical company.” In 1980 it introduced Japan’s first domestically built stepper, a semiconductor lithography tool, and it remained the world’s leading producer until 2002. [1] [2] The formula never changed. Build the core of light-handling, the lens, in-house. Complete the machine on your own. Win where that accumulated capability is decisive.
ASML was born in 1984 as a joint venture of Philips and ASM International. Its PAS 5500 platform established it in 1991, and in 2000 it moved to acquire Silicon Valley Group in the U.S. [3] Its lenses came from Zeiss in Germany, a partnership that began in 1983, before ASML formally existed. [4] In 2001 it launched TWINSCAN, which split the wafer stage in two so the next wafer could be measured while the current one was being exposed. [5] ASML’s formula never changed either. Take the best components others make. Integrate them into one system. Buy what’s missing. Re-architect when you hit a limit.
The two playbooks split over a single company. In the 1960s, Nikon clashed with Zeiss over a trademark in Germany and had to sell its cameras there under a different name. [1] To Nikon, Zeiss was a rival fighting over the same light. To ASML, Zeiss was the partner supplying it.
The first fork: water under the lens
In the early 2000s, the industry wanted shorter wavelengths of light to print finer circuits. But in 2003 Intel skipped that path, judging that key materials, including lens material, would not be ready in time. [6] [7] The alternative was immersion: keep the existing light, but fill the gap between the lens and the wafer with water. In late 2004, TSMC announced it had made working chips on an ASML immersion prototype. [8] Both companies read the signal, and both went to immersion. What differed was how.
Nikon led with its core: lens performance. It was the first in the world to ship an immersion system with a numerical aperture, a key measure of lens performance, above 1.0 [9], and it solved the water-handling method and the stage architecture on its own. [10] But customers don’t buy specs. They buy output. In the second half of 2007, Nikon said that raising the new system’s throughput had taken longer than expected. Only at its results briefing in May 2008 did it say the problems were fixed and planned throughput was being achieved. [11] [12] Doing everything yourself also means carrying every new problem yourself.
ASML started by narrowing what had to change. Of its two stages, it put water only on the exposure side and left the measurement side as it was. [13] It didn’t solve the rest alone, either. It gave its light-source supplier separate written performance targets and test methods [14], and it let a customer build working chips on a prototype first. [8] For a company whose lenses had always come from outside, putting water under the lens was a design problem, not an identity problem. By 2007, ASML had shipped more than 70 immersion systems. [15]
The second fork: the lens disappears
The second signal was bigger. Extreme ultraviolet (EUV) light, the next generation, can’t pass through glass. So an EUV system has no lenses, only mirrors. [16] For a company that had spent nearly a century building lens capability, this wasn’t a technical challenge. It was a game in which its signature weapon no longer worked. Nikon, too, had been running two EUV test systems since 2007. [17]
Just when this game called for bigger bets, the financial crisis hit. The chip and display lithography markets Nikon served shrank by nearly half. [18] In May 2009, two pieces of news broke within eleven days. A report said Nikon was putting part of its EUV development on hold; Nikon denied it and said it would deliver a production system by 2012. [17] [19] Then came plans to cut 1,000 jobs and shrink its lithography production sites. [20]
Then came the numbers at the top of this piece. In the year lithography lost ¥58.6 billion, the camera business grew operating income by 30%. That year’s annual report named the existing immersion scanners as the key to earnings in the recovery. EUV appears only as one item in a chart of sales by technology. [18]
ASML weathered the same crisis. Its 2009 sales fell 46%, and it posted a net loss of €151 million. [21] But it didn’t stop EUV. In the fourth quarter of 2010, the first second-generation EUV system arrived at a customer fab. [22]
Banseog doesn’t read this as a difference in willpower. It reads it as a difference in playbook. The company that owned the light had another light business to lean on in a crisis, and the arena where its capability no longer worked became the place to stop raising the stakes. The company that owned only the work had nothing else to fall back on, and new light was simply a material it could source again.
The people at the fork
Eric Meurice, named ASML’s CEO in 2004, came from Intel, ITT’s semiconductor group, Dell and Thomson’s TV business. [23] He hadn’t grown up inside lithography. He came from the chipmakers that buy the tools and the electronics companies that use the chips. On his watch, in 2012, ASML brought Intel, TSMC and Samsung in as co-investors. Intel agreed to buy up to 15% of the company and to put €829 million into 450mm-wafer and EUV development. [24] [25] The same year, ASML moved to acquire Cymer, a maker of lithography light sources, and closed the deal the following year. [3] [26] It shared cost and risk with its customers, and it took direct control of the source of light.
In June 2010, Nikon named Makoto Kimura, who had run its camera business for the previous seven years, as president. Michio Kariya, who had come up through the technology side, became chairman. A Japanese business weekly covered Nikon at the time under a headline that translates as “Nikon resolves to take down its ‘technical prowess’ signboard.” [27] The production EUV system promised for 2012 never appeared, and Nikon ended up among the companies that stopped developing EUV. [16]
This isn’t to say a personnel decision settled EUV. But at the very moment EUV called for a bet, Nikon’s profits and its leadership both pointed toward cameras. Cameras are a light business, too. When the path of light shifted, the company whose identity was light moved its weight to another side of the same light.
It could have been read at the time
Scroll the table horizontally to read all columns.
| Factor | Nikon | ASML |
|---|---|---|
| Origin | Three companies merged into a fully integrated optical company | Joint venture of two companies; lenses from Zeiss |
| Success formula | Built its own lenses; production leader through 2002 | Platform redesign, acquisitions, split stages |
| Pressure point | FY2009 lithography loss, job cuts, EUV hold report | 2009 sales down 46% |
| Person at the fork | 2010: president from the camera business | 2004: CEO from chipmakers and electronics |
| Immersion choice | Led on lens performance; solved problems in-house | Narrowed the change; shared the problem |
| EUV choice | Didn’t raise the stakes where its capability no longer worked | Shared cost with customers; bought the source of light |
Every fact in the top four rows was public by 2010, before the EUV contest was decided. This is not hindsight fitted to the outcome. It could have been read at the time. The era decided when each company had to choose. What each would choose was already inside it.
The path still open to Nikon
What could be read could have been acted on. But that path wasn’t to copy ASML. Bringing customers in as shareholders to split the stakes is how ASML has always worked. The path still open to Nikon lay in Nikon’s own past.
Nikon’s first stepper didn’t come from lenses alone. Shoichiro Yoshida, who led its design, recalled that its mechanics and control system were carried over from Nikon’s precision measuring machines, with a laser interferometer positioning to 0.1 micron. That first machine was built on an order from a government-led semiconductor research consortium launched in 1976. With an earlier product, too, he pitched the concept to customers first, and they raised the funds and ordered the development. [28]
That past points to two paths in 2009.
The first was to share the stakes the Nikon way. Without bringing customers in as shareholders, Nikon could pitch the concept first to the chipmakers that needed EUV most and take development orders. It had done this before. That is how its first stepper was born.
The second was to bet on the precision that came from measuring machines, not from lenses. What EUV eliminated was the lens, not the work of moving and aligning a wafer to the nanometer. Even in immersion, Nikon had solved its dual-stage architecture on its own. [10] Had Nikon read EUV not as “the game where we lose the lens” but as “the game that takes us back to the roots of our first stepper,” the calculation that its capability wouldn’t work there might have changed from the start.
That year, camera profits covered the lithography loss. [18] The same profits could have been money to move first rather than money to hold on. This isn’t Monday-morning quarterbacking. These options could have been drawn from the numbers public at the time and from the path Nikon itself had walked. A company’s alternative lies not in a competitor’s winning formula, but in something it has already done well once.
Twenty years later, the roles reversed
Nikon’s deepest capability was never the lens itself. It was precision: making the invisible visible, measuring it, aligning it. At the forks of the 2000s, Nikon used that capability only in the form of a better lens. ASML, by contrast, turned its weakness, dependence, into ownership. It bought the light-source maker Cymer outright, and in 2016 it agreed to buy a 24.9% stake in Zeiss’s semiconductor optics business. [26] [29] The company that borrowed light twenty years ago now holds the source of light.
Then, in 2025, on a new stage, advanced packaging, where multiple chips are joined together, the two companies swapped places. Nikon began taking orders for a tool that draws circuits directly onto substrates without a mask, the master plate that carries the circuit pattern. [30] ASML announced a conventional, mask-based scanner for packaging. [31] This time Nikon didn’t protect the lens. It used it. It made its lens technology the means and eliminated the medium that needed to change: the mask. A playbook isn’t destiny. Whether a company treats its capability as the goal or as the means is what turns the same playbook into a different choice.
Is your core the medium, or what you do with it?
Every industry reaches a moment when the medium changes: film to digital, engines to batteries, human hands to robots. The signal is usually visible to everyone. What differs is what each company receives it with, and that is set inside the company before the signal arrives. Companies that define themselves by the medium they hold tend to defend it on performance, or retreat, when it shakes. Companies that define themselves by what they do with the medium change the medium and bring others in.
Banseog starts by finding the way a company has chosen at its past forks. Then, together with the company, we read where that way will take it at the next fork, and what it needs to draw on to open a different path.
So the first question Banseog asks is simple. Is your company’s core the medium you hold, or what you do with it?
Scope: Banseog’s interpretation, based on the two companies’ choices and timing as documented in public sources. It does not attribute the outcome to a single cause; it reads several lines of evidence that point in the same direction.
Sources
- Nikon — founding, lithography market share, Zeiss trademark dispute
- Nikon, history of semiconductor lithography systems
- ASML Holding — founding, PAS 5500, SVG acquisition
- ZEISS, history of lithography optics (ASML partnership from 1983)
- ASML, TWINSCAN: 20 years of lithography innovation, 2021
- The 157-nm Good/Bad News from Intel, 2003
- Microlithography Faces a 157-nm Question
- TSMC immersion test announcement, December 2004
- Nikon shipment announcement, January 2006
- Nikon Annual Report 2008, printed pp. 9–10
- Nikon Q&A, interim results for FY ending March 2008
- Nikon Q&A, full-year results, May 2008
- ASML Annual Report 2006, printed p. 51
- Hosei University Working Paper 251, printed pp. 14 and 18
- ASML Annual Report 2007, printed p. 18
- Extreme ultraviolet lithography
- EE Times, Nikon EUV hold report, May 15, 2009
- Nikon Annual Report 2010, Precision Equipment and Imaging results
- EE Times, Nikon’s denial, May 18, 2009
- Manufacturing.net, Nikon to cut 1,000 jobs, May 26, 2009
- AFP via Phys.org, ASML 2009 net loss, January 2010
- Laser Focus World, first NXE:3100 shipment, January 2011
- ASML, Eric Meurice elected CEO, 2004 (SEC 6-K)
- ASML Customer Co-Investment Program announcement, July 2012
- ASML, share issuance to three customers completed, October 2012
- ASML completes acquisition of Cymer, May 2013
- Toyo Keizai Online, Nikon’s 2010 leadership change, September 2010
- SEMI Oral History, Shoichiro Yoshida (Nikon’s first stepper)
- ASML acquires 24.9% of Carl Zeiss SMT
- Nikon begins accepting DSP-100 orders, July 2025
- Bits&Chips, ASML XT:260, June 2025