Fujifilm
Fujifilm Cut Back on Photography and Kept the Film
Kodak changed too. What split the two was what they kept and where they took it. How Fujifilm moved two capabilities inside film into markets where failure is expensive, and why that choice predated the fork.
In 2007, the two giants of photographic film moved in opposite directions in the same year. In January, Kodak announced the sale of its medical imaging business. A month later, it jumped into consumer inkjet printers. [1] [2] That September, Fujifilm put a skincare line built on technology from making photographic film on store shelves [3] [4], and the following spring it bought a drugmaker. [5]
The common story is that Kodak collapsed because it refused to change. The record says otherwise. Kodak changed too. It planned to cut its traditional manufacturing infrastructure by two-thirds from 2004 levels, and it said it would grow on an intellectual property portfolio combining materials science and digital imaging science. [6] On January 19, 2012, it filed for Chapter 11 in the U.S. [7] In the fiscal year that ended that March, Fujifilm posted revenue of ¥2,195.3 billion. [8]
Both companies took the same hit. Worldwide demand for photographic film peaked in 2000. That year, Fujifilm’s photo business, covering film and photographic paper, brought in about 60% of its sales and about two-thirds of its operating profit. The market then shrank 20% to 30% a year and fell below a tenth of its peak by 2010. [9] According to Shigetaka Komori, Fujifilm’s president at the time, film profits went to nearly zero within five years of the peak. [10]
There is no single reason Kodak fell. This piece is about Fujifilm. Banseog’s answer: both companies changed. What split them was what they kept and where they took it. Fujifilm kept the capabilities inside film and moved them into markets where failure is expensive, and it had been doing exactly that long before film collapsed.
Replacing its own film, long before the fork
Fujifilm was founded in 1934, when Dainippon Celluloid spun off its photographic film division as Fuji Photo Film. [5] It was a film company from birth. Yet long before the peak, it kept building the things that would replace its own film.
In 1983, Fujifilm launched FCR, which captured X-ray images digitally instead of on film. It was the world’s first commercial digital X-ray imaging system. [11] It replaced the X-ray film Fujifilm itself was selling. In 1988, it unveiled FUJIX DS-1P, a digital camera that stored pictures on a memory card. [12]
The film base was looking for new uses, too. TAC film (FUJITAC), developed in 1954 as a non-flammable motion-picture film, became the base for photographic film. In 1993, a four-person project was set up to find new uses for it, seven years before film demand peaked. [13] TAC film went on to become the protective film for LCD polarizers, and Fujifilm held a 70% global share of TAC film (as of 2015). [14]
If anything, Kodak saw the digital signal first. The world’s first digital camera came out of Kodak in 1975. [15] [16] The signal reached both companies early.
The fork: film disappears in the 2000s
Komori became president in June 2000. He had been running Fujifilm’s European operations and came back that year to head corporate planning. [17] Before he became CEO in 2003, he ordered the head of R&D to take a full inventory of the company’s technologies. He then sorted the businesses into a four-box grid, splitting both markets and technologies into existing and new. [18]
His diagnosis was blunt: the real rival was not Kodak but digital technology. [19] Still, he had no intention of turning Fujifilm into a digital company. What he held on to was the technology and the people that film had built. [18]
In January 2006, Fujifilm announced it would cut about 5,000 jobs in its imaging segment, which included photography, and book ¥165 billion in restructuring costs across two fiscal years. The plan was to execute it all at once, from the second half of that fiscal year through the first half of the next. [20] That October, Fuji Photo Film became a holding company, FUJIFILM Holdings, and its business passed to a newly created FUJIFILM Corporation. The word “Photo” (写真) was dropped from the name. [21] The company said the change reflected its expansion into businesses beyond photography. [22] But “Photo” was the only thing it dropped. In Japanese, “film” in the company name stayed in the old spelling used at the 1934 founding, フイルム, rather than the spelling common today, フィルム. Fujifilm’s own report uses the modern spelling in its body text. [9] The company described the rename as continuing the Fujifilm brand, but Banseog doesn’t see this as a small detail. This company’s habit of separating what to drop from what to keep reaches all the way down to how it spells its own name.
That doesn’t mean it walked away from photography. In the fiscal year ended March 2013, the imaging segment, photography included, still made up 16% of sales. [8] Fujifilm cut photography back and moved it out of the center of the company.
Two capabilities inside film
The capabilities Fujifilm took out of photography ran along two lines.
The first is making the invisible visible. Photography reveals, through chemistry, the trace that light leaves behind. That capability carried into medical imaging, which used X-ray film to show the inside of the body, and in 1983 FCR moved that work to digital. [11]
The second is handling thin layers. Photographic film is a thin base coated evenly with many layers. Half of the material in film is collagen, the same main component as skin, and the technology for dispersing ingredients evenly at the nanoscale also came from making film. [4] That capability went to the skin (ASTALIFT skincare, 2007) and to the layer that covers a screen (TAC film for LCD polarizers). Then it went to the layer that wraps a drug. Fujifilm says it uses nano-dispersion technology developed through photographic film and other products to make and supply liposomes and lipid nanoparticles (LNPs), which carry drugs inside a lipid layer. [23]
In drugs, Fujifilm bought the capabilities it lacked. It took Toyama Chemical through a tender offer in 2008 [24] [5] and bought Merck’s biopharmaceutical manufacturing business in 2011. [25] [5]
In 2006, “Photo” came off the company name. But the work photography did, making the invisible visible and handling thin layers, carried on as the core of the company after the name changed.
Where it took them
Keeping a capability isn’t enough. The places Fujifilm took its capabilities, medical imaging, display materials and drug and biologics manufacturing, share three traits.
- Quality failures are expensive.
- Customer validation is long and demanding.
- Once a supplier is in, it is hard to replace.
Where all three overlap, precision built up over decades turns directly into value. Medical imaging, carried over from the X-ray film era, was the first of these. Cosmetics is closer to an exception.
Kodak took its capabilities somewhere else. It cited strategic focus and paying down secured debt as reasons for the medical sale [1], which closed in April 2007. [6] In 2010, Kodak named four growth businesses: consumer inkjet, commercial inkjet, workflow software and services, and packaging solutions. [26]
One point deserves to be stated plainly. In the fiscal year ended March 2013, Fujifilm’s largest segment, at 46% of sales, was copiers and document services. That was the business of Fuji Xerox, the joint venture in which Fujifilm raised its stake to 75% in 2001. [8] [27] Fujifilm had a big printing-side business too. But it was an existing joint venture, not a place where the capabilities taken out of film were moved.
Here is how Banseog reads the difference. Both companies talked about the capabilities inside film. Fujifilm moved them into markets where failure is expensive. Kodak sold one such market and put the weight of its growth on printing. Kodak’s bankruptcy can’t be explained by that choice alone. But the public record does show that, at the same moment, the two companies chose different places.
The people at the fork
Komori ran sales for recording media during the videotape price war [28], and he recalls watching prepress move to digital while he was in the industrial materials division. [18] He had lived through both a price war and a change of medium.
Kodak brought in Antonio Perez, who had run Hewlett-Packard’s inkjet business, as president in 2003 and made him CEO in 2005. [29] [30] The new business Kodak entered in 2007 was consumer inkjet printers, and its first products took aim at the most profitable part of market leader HP’s business: ink. [31] A former head of HP’s inkjet business had gone straight for the center of his old company’s profits.
Biography doesn’t dictate strategy. Still, the executive who had already lived through a change of medium kept the capabilities, and the executive who had run inkjet bet on printing. Where each man had been and where each company went line up.
It could have been read at the time
Scroll the table horizontally to read all columns.
| Factor | Fujifilm | Kodak (reference) |
|---|---|---|
| When it saw the digital signal | 1983 first commercial digital X-ray; 1988 digital camera unveiled | 1975 first digital camera |
| Executive at the fork | 2000 president, from European operations and corporate planning | 2003 president, from HP inkjet |
| What it cut | 2006: about 5,000 jobs in imaging | Plan to cut traditional manufacturing by two-thirds |
| Where it moved | Diagnostic imaging, display materials, drugs | Sold medical imaging; entered consumer inkjet |
| 2012 | Revenue above ¥2 trillion, nearly half from documents | Chapter 11 filing |
Everything in the top four rows happened before 2008. Banseog doesn’t look at outcomes and assign a single cause. But what each company cut and where each one moved had already been announced at the time. It could have been seen then. The collapse of film decided when they had to choose. What each would choose was already inside each company.
Is what you’re protecting the container, or the capability inside it?
In our earlier analysis, Nikon tried to protect the lens as its medium. Fujifilm shows that a company built on a medium can survive. What new technology replaces is usually the container. The capability inside can be moved into another container. And where you move it decides what comes next.
Banseog starts by finding the way a company has chosen at its past forks. Then, together with the company, we read where that way will take it at the next fork, what it should cut, and where it should move what it keeps.
So the first question Banseog asks is this. Is what your company is protecting the container, or the capability inside it? And where would that capability be worth the most?
Scope: Banseog’s interpretation, based on Fujifilm’s choices and timing as documented in public sources. Kodak is referenced only through public records from the same period, and its bankruptcy is not attributed to a single cause.
Sources
- Kodak, Health Group sale announcement, January 2007 (SEC)
- Kodak, consumer inkjet launch, February 2007
- Fujifilm Healthcare history (ASTALIFT)
- nippon.com, Fujifilm’s cosmetics development
- FUJIFILM Holdings history (Japanese)
- Kodak Annual Report (10-K), 2007
- Kodak, Chapter 11 filing announcement, January 19, 2012 (SEC)
- FUJIFILM Holdings IR presentation, March 2014 (revenue and segments)
- Fujifilm Integrated Report 2019, pp. 8–9
- Toyo Keizai Online, Fujifilm’s revival (part 1), January 12, 2011
- Fujifilm Medical history (FCR)
- Fujifilm, photo culture activities (FUJIX DS-1P)
- Toyo Keizai Online, Fujifilm’s revival (part 3), January 13, 2011
- Japan Patent Office IP Achievement Award 2015, Fujifilm TAC film
- Kodak milestones
- IEEE Spectrum, history of the first digital camera, 2022
- Fujifilm U.S.A., Shigetaka Komori biography, March 2006
- Bungeishunju, interview with Shigetaka Komori, 2020
- SBBIT, Shigetaka Komori lecture, July 2019
- SBBIT, Fujifilm restructuring announcement, January 31, 2006
- PHILE WEB, holding-company conversion and name change, September 2006
- Photography Blog, Fuji Photo Film name change announcement, 2006
- Fujifilm pharmaceutical business (liposomes, LNPs)
- Yakuji Nippo, Toyama Chemical ownership plan, February 2008
- Merck, Fujifilm to acquire biomanufacturing network, February 2011
- Kodak Annual Report (10-K), 2010
- FUJIFILM Holdings history (English)
- PRESIDENT Online, Shigetaka Komori, June 2014
- Kodak names Antonio Perez president, April 2003
- Kodak 8-K, 2007 (Perez elected CEO in 2005)
- Fortune, Kodak inkjets target the heart of HP’s profit, February 5, 2007