What Fujifilm carried from photographic film into its next business

Ink must flow reliably inside a press. Once it reaches paper, it must stop before it spreads. Stability in storage and rapid change during printing have to coexist.

That was one of the problems facing the developers of Fujifilm’s Jet Press 720. Making good ink was not enough. They had to coordinate the sequence of reactions on the paper with the conditions under which the printhead ejected the ink. [1]

This small contradiction offers a useful way into the transformation of a photographic-film company. It reveals more than the familiar account of diversification into cosmetics and healthcare: it shows what an existing capability had to preserve, and what it had to change, when it encountered a new customer problem.

Fujifilm’s transition was not simply the transfer of a finished film technology. It involved developing materials and equipment together to meet new conditions of use. We examine that interpretation through the development and customer adoption of its inkjet business.

The acquisition list contained the next question

Fujifilm acquired Sericol in 2005, followed by Avecia’s inkjet business and Dimatix in 2006. Ink and colorant capabilities were joined by printheads that could eject liquids precisely. The company also established its Advanced Research Laboratories in April 2006. [2]

Its 2006 annual report described an existing technology base centered on organic synthesis developed through photosensitive-materials research, alongside polymers and thin multilayer coating. [3]

The intended combination was public. Fujifilm said it would bring its ink technology together with Dimatix’s printheads to print on a range of materials. The same report described technology integration across three corporate research laboratories, while listing divisional laboratories separately. It did not say that every laboratory had been merged into one. [4]

A reader at the time could see the intention to combine capabilities. Common ownership of ink and printheads did not guarantee a better product or a customer willing to buy it.

The deeper question comes after “what did the company acquire?” Did the acquired technology expand the uses of existing capabilities—and did those existing capabilities change the acquired company’s products in return?

Filling a gap in a technology portfolio and creating a process of mutual improvement are different achievements.

Good materials do not automatically make good printing

The Jet Press 720 had to produce quality results on ordinary offset-printing paper without an ink-absorbing layer. The developers applied a treatment liquid to the paper first, causing pigment and resin particles in the incoming ink to aggregate rapidly and limit spreading. They also worked on dispersants, resin design, drying and fixing conditions.

The development paper’s account of unsuccessful formulations matters. Changes intended to reduce paper curl created problems elsewhere: surface strength, storage stability or nozzle ejection. Improving one property could worsen another. The team adjusted formulations, dispersion technology and the system for preventing nozzle blockage together. [1]

This was not a matter of taking an existing formula into another market unchanged. It required accumulated materials knowledge to resolve a new set of conflicting conditions.

That distinction changes what a company should preserve. A finished product or fixed formulation may not fit a new use. The ability to control when a material flows, stops and adheres can provide a starting point for another product. This case does not, however, establish that every ink technology originated directly in photographic film.

Fujifilm’s records also show how materials work connected to printhead development.

Did the acquired company change, too?

A 2014 technical paper describes Fujifilm’s Advanced Research Laboratories in Kanagawa working with two UK ink subsidiaries on high-performance inks. Results from developing presses such as the Jet Press 720—including printhead handling and ink drying and fixing—were fed back into Dimatix’s printhead designs. The SAMBA head is presented as a combination of Dimatix’s inkjet technology and technologies from across the group. [5]

Materials expertise entered more than the ink. The paper describes Fujifilm’s proprietary PZT thin-film formation technology in SAMBA’s piezoelectric actuator, which drives ink ejection. Rather than grinding bulk material down to a thin layer, forming the film simplified manufacturing and stabilized ejection performance, according to the developers. Here, materials technology reached inside the acquired equipment technology. [6]

An acquisition announcement or a new laboratory alone could not establish this connection. The account is the company’s own, but it specifies which technology was applied and which development results changed which designs.

The printhead was both a component for delivering Fujifilm’s ink and an object of improvement through ink and process development. Knowledge moved in both directions.

The stronger sign of integration was therefore not two subsidiaries appearing on the same organization chart. It was a problem discovered on one side changing the design on the other, with that change returning as better performance in the finished product.

Customers buy repeatable results

The next question is whether the connection reached customers.

A Fujifilm customer case published in summer 2019 describes US printer Wright Printing adding a J Press 750S after operating two 720S presses. J Press is the North American product name. The customer emphasized consistent color across changing jobs and the ability to show a sample produced on the actual production press. [7]

The ink-droplet problem now becomes a customer promise. Can a repeat order reproduce the same color? Can the gap between an approved sample and the delivered job be reduced? The combination of materials and printheads becomes a reason to buy when it helps a complete product honor those promises.

This is a supplier-selected customer interview. It documents an additional purchase and the benefits the customer described, not an independently verified investment return. Figures from the original 720 development paper cannot be assigned to later models, nor can the customer’s results be attributed to one acquisition.

Nevertheless, the evidence now extends beyond a list of purchases:

An intention to combine ink and printheads → joint development and feedback into design → a finished product → a customer’s additional purchase.

The earlier events do not explain every later result. But the sequence is substantially more concrete than an assumption that the technologies should complement one another.

Kodak adds a financial condition to the story

It would be a mistake to turn this account into “Fujifilm changed; Kodak did not.”

Kodak also acquired printing capabilities. Kodak Polychrome Graphics, or KPG, began as a 50–50 venture with Sun Chemical. Kodak bought the remaining interest in 2005, paying $317 million in cash at closing and assuming subsequent payment obligations. It, too, was combining external capabilities and expanding control. [8]

Acquisition lists alone therefore cannot explain their different trajectories. The existing businesses and financing that supported the transition also matter.

Fujifilm had raised its interest in Fuji Xerox to 75% in 2001. In the year ended March 2006, Document Solutions accounted for 41.3% of consolidated revenue. Net cash provided by operating activities was approximately ¥272.6 billion, while net cash used in investing activities was approximately ¥272.1 billion. The existing business base was substantial, and so were the competing uses of funds. Document-business revenue cannot be treated as cash freely available to inkjet development. [2] [9]

Kodak also owned a healthcare business. Its 2007 sale brought in $2.35 billion in cash at closing; approximately $1.15 billion was subsequently used to repay a secured term loan under its credit agreement. “Healthcare” as a business label does not explain a company’s direction. An asset retained as a source of future earnings and an asset sold to reduce financial obligations create different conditions for the next decision. [10]

These figures are not a scorecard for the companies’ fortunes. They do not establish how much Fuji Xerox directly financed Jet Press development, or how Kodak would have fared without a particular acquisition. They show that the time needed to turn combined technologies into products had to coexist with other businesses and financial commitments.

The same direction did not require the same degree of ownership

An alternative path should begin with choices that actually existed.

KPG was already a joint venture. A relevant alternative for Kodak was therefore to retain joint ownership and change the timing of cash expenditure and full control—not an unspecified proposal to “partner instead of acquiring.”

That might have avoided or deferred the purchase price and subsequent payments, but Kodak would have continued sharing earnings and decisions. The other shareholder’s intentions, the joint-venture agreement and further investment needs could have made continuation difficult. This is a conditional alternative grounded in an actual transaction, not a claim that it would have prevented Kodak’s later bankruptcy proceedings.

The same question applies to Fujifilm. Improving ink, printheads and processes together does not necessarily require ownership of every related company. The scope of joint design, responsibility for costs and rights to use the results determine what an alliance can accomplish.

The transferable lesson is therefore a choice about control: secure enough control to let the technologies change one another, without making its cost consume the time needed to develop them.

Look for the next market in conditions of use

A later customer case illustrates both the extension of this pattern and its limits.

German packaging printer Ebro Color installed a Jet Press 720S in 2018. In Fujifilm’s case study, the company explains that it had used offset printing for food-packaging work regardless of volume, but applying FS-1 ink opened the option of printing that work digitally. This does not establish suitability for all food packaging. It shows what a new ink made possible for this particular customer. [11]

Even a customer with a good press can be unable to enter a new application. A sharper image alone will not open that market. Appropriate materials and validation are also required.

A follow-up search should be equally specific. One could look for packaging printers already handling short runs but unable to move certain jobs to digital because of the contents or packaging structure. The first task would be to distinguish constraints in ink formulation, drying and adhesion from those in customer qualification. This is a proposed direction for further research, not a claim to have discovered an unexamined market.

The 2006 report showed the intent to combine capabilities. Development papers in 2012 and 2014 revealed actual technology and collaboration. Later customer cases added evidence of adoption. Reading that sequence backward cannot establish that success was predicted at the outset. It can show what to watch early and which evidence to wait for next.

The pattern is more demanding than “old technology may have another use.” Existing capabilities must change alongside other technologies when they meet a new customer’s conditions, and the resulting improvement must remain in a product that can be sold again.

What should a company preserve: today’s product, or the ability to solve the conditions of its next one? Which technologies, customer relationships and development time must it secure before that capability becomes a transaction? Fujifilm’s ink droplet makes those questions tangible.

Independent analysis based on public sources. Development records and customer cases support the account of technology integration and adoption; they do not establish returns on individual acquisitions or explain the companies’ overall fortunes.